Just a note to thank those who offered comments on the revisions of “Risk relativism and physical law”. This has now been accepted by Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, where it will feature as part of a “Debate” with invited comments from couple of epidemiologists. Not entirely sure when, since they will presumably have to write their comments now. Anyway I really appreciate the feedback I got on this one – definitely improved the final result. Thanks.
Comments sought: Risk relativism and physical law
The attached is a revise and resubmit, and will form part of a Debate in Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health. I have until 25 July to submit. Comments are very welcome. Text is 2100 words. Feel free to comment/track changes in the doc if so inclined.
2014-07-19 Risk relativism and physical law – version for comment
Could RR be (like) a constant?
Have decided that my argument at the end of these slides doesn’t hold up… but there’s something there. I’m now trying to figure out why RR can’t be a constant in an epidemiological law. I’m sure it can’t, but why not?
Risk Relativism and Physical Law: draft slides
Here is a link to draft slides for my talk on Friday at the KCL workshop Prediction in Epidemiology and Healthcare, organised by Jonathan Fuller and Luis Flores:
2014-06-20 Risk Relativism and Physical Law
Comments welcome.
Absolute and relative measures – what’s the difference?
I’m re-working a paper on risk relativism in response to some reviewer comments, and also preparing a talk on the topic for Friday’s meeting at KCL, “Prediction in Epidemiology and Healthcare”. The paper originates in Chapter 8 of my book, where I identify some possible explanations for “risk relativism” and settle on the one I think is best. Briefly, I suggest that there isn’t really a principled way of distinguishing “absolute” and “relative” measures, and instead explain the popularity of relative risk by its superficial similarity to a law of physics, and its apparent independence of any given population. These appearances are misleading, I suggest.
In the paper I am trying to develop the suggestion a bit into an argument. Two remarks by reviewers point me in the direction of further work I need to do. One is the question as to what, exactly, the relation between RR and law of nature is supposed to be. Exactly what character am I supposing that laws have, or that epidemiologists think laws have, such that RR is more similar to a law-like statement than, say, risk difference, or population attributable fraction?
The other is a reference to a literature I don’t know but certainly should, concerning statistical modelling in the social sciences. I am referred to a monograph by Achen in 1982, and a paper by Jan Vandebroucke in 1987, both of which suggest – I gather – a deep scepticism about statistical modelling in the social sciences. Particularly thought-provoking is the idea that all such models are “qualitative descriptions of data”. If there is any truth in that, then it is extremely significant, and deserves unearthing in the age of big data, Google Analytics, Nate Silver, and generally the increasing confidence in the possibility of accurately modelling real world situations, and – crucially – generating predictions out of them.
A third question concerns the relation between these two thoughts: (i) the apparent law-likeness of certain measures contrasted with the apparently population-specific, non-general nature of others; and (ii) the limitations claimed for statistical modelling in some quarters contrasted with confidence in others. I wonder whether degree of confidence has anything to do with perceived law-likeness. One’s initial reaction would be to doubt this: when Nate Silver adjusts his odds on a baseball outcome, he surely does not take himself to be basing his prediction on a law-like generalisation. Yet on reflection, he must be basing it on some generalisation, since the move from observed to unobserved is a kind of generalising. What more, then, is there to the notion of a law, than generalisability on the basis of instances? It is surprising how quickly the waters deepen.
Relative Activity in philosepi
Having neglected this blog for several months I find myself suddenly swamped with things to write about. My book has been translated into Korean by Hyundeuk Cheon, Hwang Seung-sik, and Mr Jeon, and judging by their insightful comments and questions they have done a superb and careful job. Next week there is a workshop on Prediction in Epidemiology and Healthcare at KCL, organised by Jonathan Fuller and Luis Jose Flores, which promises to be exciting. Coming up in August is the World Congress of Epidemiology, where I’m giving two talks, hopefully different ones – one on stability for a session on translation and public engagement, and one on the definition of measures of causal strength as part of a session for the next Dictionary of Epidemiology. And I’m working on a paper on risk relativism which has been accepted by Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health subject to revisions in response to the extremely interesting comments of 5 reviewers – I think this is possibly the most rigorous and most useful review process I have encountered. Thus this is a promissory note, by which I hope to commit my conscience to writing here about risk relativism, stability and measures of causal strength in the coming weeks.
Link
I surely should have posted this earlier, but it’s currently in progress, and very stimulating.
A taste of my own medicine
Yesterday I briefed the media on my work and recent book on philosophy of epidemiology, ahead of next week’s launch event at the University of Johannesburg, and today one piece appeared in the Times (here) and two (here and here) in the Star. All the pieces are reasonably fair, and the latter two in particular are more conceptually focused, and thus quite a nice reflection of what I try to do. But it’s interesting for me that what grabbed the most attention were largely empirical claims. A couple of radio stations picked up on the claim that the vitamin supplements industry is a “con”, appearing in the Times piece, and I was interviewed at lunchtime today by Talk 702 and RSG. Both homed in on my claims about vitamins. Talk 702 asked if I expected any defamation actions. I guess this is how the media works – you never quite know which part of what you say is going to be amplified over the rest. That said, I am very grateful to the Times journalist that the context of my “con” claim was included in the piece.
For interest, I thought I would upload the presentation I gave yesterday. Not much about vitamins in there, you will see: 2013-09-10 Media Briefing – Philosophy of Epidemiology
Prediction paper – comments welcome
Comments welcome on this general philosophical paper on prediction that I’ve just finished drafting. Hoping to submit somewhere soon.
2013-08-09 DRAFT What is a good prediction
(Also over at academia.edu: http://www.academia.edu/4201898/2013_08_09_DRAFT_What_is_a_good_prediction)
Is breast best?
Following my post on the recent debate about being overweight, my attention was drawn to a recent systematic review of the long-term effects of breastfeeding published by the World Health Organisation (WHO). The report raises some related issues, and some that are interesting in their own right.
The review suggests the long-term benefits of breast-feeding do not seem especially dramatic. This is in contrast to the attitude to breast-feeding in some, but by no means all, developed countries, where breast-feeding is strongly encouraged. This raises the question as to why it is so strongly encouraged, and why parents should feel “guilt” (as one news report puts it) if they do not breast-feed.
Two points strike me about this. First, as in the discussion about the correct message on being overweight, there may be an argument that the simple message is the right one even if it isn’t accurate. On this line of argument – which I don’t endorse – the message “breast is best” ought to be put about even if the reality is more complicated. Maybe high quality formula made with sterilised water will not be significantly worse for a healthy baby than breast milk (goes this line of thought); however, there are many situations where breast-feeding can make the difference between life and death – where water quality is dubious, and where high quality formula is too expensive, for example. So better to stick with “breast is best”, and let some conscientious persons endure guilt that is strictly unnecessary. Besides, there is no evidence that breast is not best – only that it not make as much of a difference as that slogan may suggest.
As in the case of the message on being overweight, I think this argument is not a good one. A distinction must be drawn between necessary simplification for communication purposes, which we all do, all the time; and making assertions that go beyond the evidence. Perhaps we all do that too, but we shouldn’t. The worrying possibility that this systematic review raises is that the breast-feeding drive in some countries – the UK is one I know a little about – has gone well beyond the evidence that would justify it, which presumably means it is driven by ideology or conviction more than by evidence. The persistence and dangers of medical convictions, albeit deeply and honestly held, are well-known, most famously associated with the practice of blood-letting, and most recently highlighted by the evidence-based medicine movement.
The second point occurring to me is that there is no study that can settle the question of what is best for a given child. The slogan “breast is best” is ambiguous, because “best” can be read in more than one way. It could mean nutritionally best, in which case, the study seems to confirm that the slogan is true. Or it could mean best for the child, all things considered. In many situations, the two go together, especially in low-resource settings for reasons previously mentioned. But they are not the same. In higher-resource settings, it is easy to imagine breast-feeding having considerable costs for a child, all things considered. A breast-feeding mother may be less able to pursue her career, which may affect household income; and that appears to be an important social determinant of health. The psychological effect on the mother of forsaking professional opportunities might also have an impact on the child and the family as a whole. This will obviously depend on the particular mother and on the particular family. Some mothers might be in a position to balance demands; some may not have or want jobs or careers of a sort that would be impacted. But there are at least some women who see motherhood as forcing them to make sacrifices in their professional lives. Bottle-feeding may reduce the extent of these sacrifices, making it possible for other people to look after the child during the day, and indeed the night. In a nutshell, one size doesn’t fit all, contrary to what the “breast is best” slogan suggests. It could be that bottle, not breast, is best for a particular child, when all the circumstances are considered.
The review raises this possibility because the size of the long-term advantage of breast-feeding appears to exist, but to be small. For example, there appears to be a positive causal link between breast-feeding and IQ. But the size is small, and as the report points out, it isn’t clear how much of an advantage a small improvement in performance on intelligence tests really is (or really indicates, perhaps). It is easy to imagine a small advantage in intelligence being outweighed by factors such as having a higher household income, or simply having a happier mother. And of course if we expand the scope of outcomes beyond the strictly health-related then the imaginative task becomes even easier.
These issues are complex. Nonetheless it seems to me that there is a difference between simplifying and distorting. Breast-feeding makes significant demands of a particular individual (the mother), which are in part justified by the health benefits for another (the child). Because these demands are so significant, and because the moral compulsion involved is so strong, it cannot be right to overstate the advantages of breastfeeding relative to nearly-as-good alternatives, where these are available. Nor can it be right to ignore the possibility of socially mediated health effects of breastfeeding (household income, family happiness, etc.) and focus exclusively on nutritional effects. The slogan “breast is best” may be appropriate in areas riddled with cholera and dysentery (I make no judgement about that) but I doubt that it is justified in, for example, the UK, and relevantly similar countries.